电器与能效管理技术 ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8): 19-31.doi: 10.16628/j.cnki.2095-8188.2026.08.003

• 研究与分析 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑多主体运营商合作博弈的电动汽车充放电引导策略*

吴文娴1, 李欣2, 许翰宸1, 马佳炜1, 赵紫恒1, 於慧敏1   

  1. 1 国网江苏省电力有限公司 无锡供电分公司, 江苏 无锡 214000
    2 南京工程学院 电力工程学院, 江苏 南京 211167
  • 收稿日期:2026-03-24 出版日期:2026-08-30 发布日期:2026-09-16
  • 作者简介:吴文娴(1997—),女,中级会计师,硕士,主要从事电力系统管理研究。|李 欣(1999—),女,硕士,研究方向为电网运行与控制技术。|许翰宸(1998—),男,硕士,主要从事新型电力系统自动化研究。
  • 基金资助:
    * 国网无锡供电公司面向生产一线科技项目(WX2025012)

Charging and Discharging Guidance Strategy for Electric Vehicles Considering Cooperative Game of Multi-Agent Operators

Wu Wenxian1, Li Xin2, Xu Hanchen1, Ma Jiawei1, Zhao Ziheng1, Yu Huimin1   

  1. 1 Wuxi Power Supply Branch, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Wuxi 214000, China
    2 School of Electric Power Engineering, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China
  • Received:2026-03-24 Online:2026-08-30 Published:2026-09-16

摘要:

针对电动汽车无序充电问题,建立多主体运营商合作博弈的充放电引导策略来提升能源利用效率和联盟收益。首先,构建多运营商合作博弈模型;然后,基于韦伯-费希纳定律分析充放电激励水平对用户心理的影响,结合电池损耗和用户焦虑程度提出充放电双重激励机制;最后,提出以联盟成员贡献度差异为标准的改进Shapley值收益分配策略。仿真结果表明,在有合作、有激励场景下,策略能有效增加联盟收益、合理分配收益,同时缩短用户排队时间、降低充电成本。结论显示,该策略有助于维持运营商的积极性与联盟的稳定性,为电动汽车充放电管理提供实用方案。

关键词: 电动汽车, 电动汽车充电运营商, 合作博弈, 利益最大化, 充放电激励机制

Abstract:

To address the problem of unregulated charging of electric vehicles, a charge-discharge guidance strategy based on multi-operator cooperative game is established to improve energy utilization efficiency and alliance profit. First, a multi-operator cooperative game model is constructed; then, based on the Weber-Fechner law, the impact of charge-discharge incentive levels on user psychology is analyzed. Considering battery degradation and user degree, a dual incentive mechanism for charging and discharging is proposed. Finally, an improved Shapley value profit distribution strategy based on differences in the contribution of alliance members is proposed. Simulation results show that in a scenario with cooperation and incentives, the strategy can effectively increase alliance benefits, reasonably distribute profits, while reducing user queuing time and charging costs. The conclusion indicates that this strategy helps maintain operator enthusiasm and alliance stability, providing a practical solution for electric vehicle charge-discharge management.

Key words: electric vehicles, electric vehicle charging operators, cooperative game, profit maximization, charge and discharge incentive mechanism

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